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 Selecting the type of contract is an important aspect of governing interfirm transactions. The 
purpose of this article is to examine the use of fixed-fee and time-and-materials (T&M, or cost-plus) 
contracts and a hybrid contract that consists of a T&M contract with a cap. In addition to uncertainty 
and measurement factors, we also address a relatively unexplored aspect of contracting-how the prior 
relationship between the firms influences the type of contract the firms select. Using data on 394 
contracts from the information technology (IT) services industry, we show that T&M contracts are 
preferred when the cost of measuring quality ex post is high and when it is difficult to estimate costs ex 
ante. We also find site-specific measures of relationship lead to a preference for tow-powered T&M 
contracts. 
 
1. Introduction 
 Contracts have been the subject of theoretical and empirical work in agency theory and 
transaction cost economics for more than 30 years. Most of the contract literature, beginning with 
Cheung (1969), has focused on risk allocation and agency Issues as the fundamental determinants of 
contract choice. Following Cheung, other theoretical and empirical work on contract choice has 
examined a variety of determinants of contract choice, including measurement costs (Allen and Lueck, 
1993), double-sided moral hazard (Lafontaine, 1992), enforcement costs (Allen and Lueck, 1992a), 
supervision costs (Alston, Dutta, and Nugent, 1984), and the role of financial constraints (Laffont and 
Matoussi, 1995). Furthermore, most theory on contracting has focused on attributes of the current 
exchange rather than the history of interaction between the two parties. While sociologists and 
organization theorists have long argued that business transactions are strongly influenced by 
relationships and social context (e.g., Granovetter, 1985; Gulati. 1995; Adler, 2001), and while 
institutional economists have similarly incorporated relationships into their arguments (e.g., Williamson, 
1979), empirical researchers have only recently examined how relationships affect the choice of 
contractual form (e.g., Bancrjee and Duflo, 2000; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Corts and Singh, 2003). 
 In this article we analyze the role of uncertainty and measurement issues and the prior 
relationship between the parties on the use of fixed-fee contracts, time-and-materials (T&M. or cost-
plus) contracts, and hybrid contracts (a T&M contract with a cap). There is currently no consensus in the 
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literature regarding how a prior relationship influences contract choice. We examine the magnitude of 
the prior relationship and explore different ways to measure the prior relationship between two firms. 
 We analyzed a sample of 394 contracts written by a large supplier (hereafter referred to 
fictitiously as Compustar) in the information technology (IT) industry. In these IT contracts, the supplier 
is contracted to perform some type of service involving equipment in the buyer’s data center or some 
other component of the buyer’s IT networking infrastructure (e.g., mainframes, storage devices, 
servers). Each contract represents a separate project for which Compustar supplied a distinct service for 
the buyer. The contracts, along with interviews with several of the firm’s managers and engineers, allow' 
us to analyze the determinants of contract choice. 
 The article is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses the extant contracting 
literature. The third section describes the three types of contracts prevalent in IT and develops 
predictions regarding the determinants of choice among them. The remaining sections describe the 
data, methods, and results of our analysis. Ordered probit analyses were employed to evaluate how the 
choice of contract type is affected not only by relationships but also by ex ante cost uncertainty and ex 
post quality measurement. We conclude with a discussion of our results and the implications for future 
research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 Contracting has been the subject of a great amount of theoretical and empirical analysis [see 
Boemcr and Macher (2002) and Shelanski and Klein (1995) for overviews of the empirical work on 
contracting]. Work in this area has examined different types of contracts and contract clauses and the 
factors that lead to their use in a variety of settings. Studies of contract choice typically analyze the 
choice among various types of contracts, usually cost-plus contracts and fixed-fee contracts (e.g., 
Eswaran and Kotw al, 1985; Allen and Lueck. 1992a. 1992b), and examine attributes of the current 
transaction to determine the optimal contract. 
 The effect of relationships on contracting has been a subject of recent debate. Institutional 
economists have also long acknowledged that long-term relationships are ideal for certain transactions 
(Williamson, 1979). Sociologists generally have concluded that relationships decrease the reliance on 
contracts due to an increase in trust between the parties (e.g.. Ring and Van de Ven, 1994: Gulati, 1995; 
Adler, 2001). Recent theoretical work in institutional economics, however, has found that relationships 
and contracts can complement one another (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994). 
 Recent empirical studies have also investigated this issue, but they have not arrived at 
consistent conclusions. Corts and Singh (2004) found that as partners interact repeatedly in the offshore 
oil-drilling industry, the parties are more likely to use a contract with weaker incentives, such as a T&M 
contract. Chisholm (1997) finds a similar effect in the case of contracts between movie stars and 
producers. On the other hand, Mayer (1999) found that better relationships and strong incentive 
contracts are complements in a case study of software contracting. Further, Poppo and Zenger (2002) 
and Ryall and Sampson (2003), using surveys from the information services industry and a sample of 
technology alliance contracts, respectively, found that better relationships and contract complexity are 
complements. Banerjee and Duflo (2000) found no significant effect of partner experience on the 
contractual form chosen, but they did show that Indian software firms with more established 
reputations rely more on cost-plus contracts, while younger, less established firms are more likely to use 
fixed- fee contracts with stronger incentives. 
 In this article we build on tills literature by examining the influence of relationships on three 
contract types. While previous articles have used binary measures (Chisholm, 1997; Bancijee and Duflo, 
2000), counts of previous contracts (Corts and Singh, 2004), and survey items regarding buyer and 
supplier perceptions (Poppo and Zenger, 2002) to capture the extensiveness of relationships, we 
examine the magnitude of prior business between the firms at both the site and corporate levels. 
 
3. Variation of Contractual Form in Information Technology 
 We focused on three types of contracts in use in a wide variety of industries: fixed-fee contracts, 
T&M contracts, and T&M contracts with a cap (hybrids). Fixed-fee contracts consist of a lump-sum 
payment in exchange for the completion of services as specified by the contract. T&M contracts (also 
known as cost-plus contracts) involve the buyer directing the supplier to work on a particular task in 
exchange for a specified amount per hour or per day plus expenses. Executives in the IT industry who 
were interviewed for this study indicated that T&M contracts were often employed so that work could 
begin without a full identification of project scope. The total price in such cases is not predetermined, so 
the supplier can more easily pass on any costs resulting from buyer-requested changes. The lack of a 
fixed price also means that the buyer bears the financial risk of the project coming in over budget. 
 Placing a “cap' on a T&M contract creates a hybrid contract that combines the features of T&M 
and fixed-fee contracts. This type of hybrid contract is used in many industries to balance incentives for 
cost efficiency and quality (Bercnds, 2000). Reichelstein (1992:713) quoted a General Accounting Office 
(GAO) report that concluded that such hybrid contracts would be appropriate w here “‘the government 
has a sound basis to estimate costs, but w here uncertainties exist that make a fixed-price contract 
impractical’ (GAO, 1987,1).” This type of hybrid contract can also be valuable to buyers because it 
provides an upper limit on their exposure, an attribute that can facilitate budget approval. 
 
4. Determinants of Contract Choice 
 We argue that two types of measurement issues are particularly relevant for contract choice: ex 
ante uncertainty over expected costs and the cost of measuring quality ex post. In addition, we explore 
the effect of the prior relationship between the buyer and supplier on the choice of the current 
contract. We will now examine how each of these factors is likely to affect contract choice. 
 
4.1 Ex Ante Uncertainty Regarding Actual Cost and Project Specification 
 Fixed-fee contracts provide suppliers with strong incentives to operate efficiency because the 
supplier bears all cost overruns. Allowing the supplier to keep the results of any cost savings also creates 
strong incentives for suppliers to autonomously adapt to external changes in technology or input prices 
that can lower costs. This creates stronger incentives to innovate in the area of cost reduction than are 
present in a T&M contract. 
 When a project is complex, total cost becomes difficult to estimate in advance and the exact 
specification of the final output is difficult to define. In such cases, fixed-fee contracts become 
problematic, as variations from the agreed-upon requirements require costly renegotiation. Bajari and 
Tadelis (2001) and Corts and Singh (2004) argued that a primary benefit of a T&M contract, relative to a 
fixed-fee contract, is the reduced cost of renegotiation. In Bajari and Tadelis' model, the supplier's 
private information about the cost of any proposed changes leads to a positive probability that the 
contract renegotiation will fail in the case of fixed-fee contracts. Tills probability increases with contract 
complexity. In T&M contracts, this possibility is removed by the fact that the supplier is always 
guaranteed a nonnegative return as long as the original project scope is adhered to. More generally, in 
the case of T&M contracts, as requirements change, the buyer is more likely to be able to persuade the 
supplier to incorporate the necessary changes without any need to renegotiate the initial contract. Thus 
T&M contracts facilitate adaptation to changes after the project is under way. 
 We also argue that when uncertainty is at an intermediate level the parties may choose to 
employ a hybrid T&M contract with a cap. On the one hand, as long as the cap is not exceeded, the 
hybrid contract contains the renegotiation benefits of the T&M contract. On the other hand, the 
incentive benefits of a fixed-fee contract are available after the cap has been reached. It is therefore 
likely that fixed-fee contracts will be used when costs are easy to estimate, T&M contracts with a cap 
will be used when there is some level of difficulty in estimating costs, and T&M contracts will be used 
when costs are very hard to estimate. 
 
4.2 Cost of Measuring Quality Ex Post 
 A related issue that plays a role in the choice of contract type is the ability of the buyer to 
measure quality after the task has been completed. Analyses of the impact of moral hazard on economic 
organization date back to Holmstrom (1979). Because the supplier has incentives to underprovide 
quality and to operate efficiently under a fixed-fee contract, the buyer's ability to verify the level of 
quality ex post is important. Anderson (1985) showed that if performance evaluation of a sales agent 
was difficult, for example, the firm preferred a lower-powered employment contract to a higher-
powered contract with an independent sales agent in order to mitigate the incentive to shirk 
responsibilities in the area of quality. If the potential for latent problems or hidden defects is high, than 
a fixed-fee contract is problematic. Suppliers have a strong incentive to reduce quality in ways that 
buyers cannot easily detect if by doing so they can reduce the cost of the project. Low-powered 
contracts such as T&M reduce this problem. In fact, T&M contracts may create an incentive to 
oversupply quality in order to increase costs that can be passed along to the buyer to increase revenue 
for the project. 
 As with the presence of ex ante uncertainty over expected costs, when measurement costs are 
at an intermediate level, hybrids may be an effective alternative to the two polar forms. At moderate 
levels of ex post measurement costs, the existence of a cap on the buyer’s exposure may be more 
attractive than a fixed-fee contract because of the weaker incentives for the supplier to underprovide 
quality. 
4.3 Prior Relationships and Contract Choice 
 Sociologists and organization theorists have long argued that business transactions are strongly 
influenced by relationships and social context (e.g., Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995), and institutional 
economists have offered similar arguments with different implications (e.g., Williamson, 1979; Baker, 
Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994; Argyres and Liebeskind. 1999). There are several mechanisms through 
which relationships may influence contract choice. First, the parties now have experience with the other 
party honoring a commitment. If they choose to enter another contract, it is because they think the 
other party can be trusted and will deal honorably with any unexpected contingencies that arise. 
Second, when two firms work together for the first time, they have to establish norms of interaction 
that take some time to set up. Prior interaction helps firms learn how to work with one another more 
effectively. Third, the previous contract can be seen as a template in terms of what clauses and language 
to include in order to facilitate approval by management of both parties. Finally, the promise of future 
business is greater with repeat customers, so the supplier has every incentive to be honest and flexible 
in order to win more future business from the customer. Since the cost of shirking, in terms of future 
business lost, is higher, the supplier is less likely to allow it to occur. 
 Corts and Singh (2004) explicitly theorized about the effects of relationships on contract choice. 
They held that the effect of relationships on the binary choice between a fixed-fee and T&M contract is 
not determinable based only on the length of the buyer/supplier relationship. Long relationships are 
likely to decrease renegotiation costs, making fixed-fee contracts more attractive. However, long 
relationships are also likely to reduce costs stemming from supplier shirking, implying that a T&M 
contract is to be preferred. Thus, whether long relationships lead to more fixed- fee or T&M contracts 
depends upon which type of cost decreases more quickly. 
 Hybrid contracts may be used when the relationship between the buyer and supplier has not yet 
developed that is, when there have been few interactions between buyer and supplier. We extend Corts 
and Singh’s (2004) argument above regarding the decrease of both renegotiation COSLS and the costs of 
shirking. A relationship may decrease these costs and increase the accuracy with which these costs can 
be assessed ex ante (i.e., the relationship will also decrease the variance of the costs). The idea that 
repeated interactions will decrease variance in contracting costs, such as those associated with 
renegotiation or shirking, has foundations in both organizational economics and organizational behavior 
research. For example, Williamson (1979:240) stated that through repeated transactions, “specialized 
language develops as experience accumulates and nuances are signaled and received in a sensitive 
way.” Furthermore, Williamson (1999:1104) states, “both parties learn better about the nature of the 
contractual hazards and of their abilities to communicate and their propensities to cooperate.” Finally, 
organizational behavior researchers (e.g.. Ring and Van de Yen, 1994) have argued that repeated 
interaction leads to a congruence of values and expectations. Improved communication and value 
congruence both may decrease renegotiation costs and likelihood of shirking for future contracts. 
 As a result of the high variance of negotiating and shrinking costs in a new relationship, the 
buyer would be uncertain about which of the polar contracting forms would cost less, and the hybrid 
form provides some insurance against the costs of both types of contracts. As the variance of both cost 
types decreases with repealed interaction, eventually the insurance function of the hybrid form may 
become less valuable, and thus its use should decline. 
 The preceding analysis assumes that prior interaction leads to good relationships, but this is not 
always the case. If poor interaction leads to termination, then interaction always leads, ultimately, to 
strong relationships. Williamson (1999:1104) commented that "learning [from repealed interaction] will 
have a bearing on contract renewal... Serious dissatisfaction on the part of buyer or supplier could result 
in nonrenewal.” However, it may be the case that disputes arise but the parties work through them and 
learn more about one another as a result, which could lead to a desire for more flexible future contracts 
or to contracts with more safeguards (e.g., Crocker and Reynolds, 1993). We believe that disputes will 
more likely simply lead to termination in the IT industry, however, because of the ready availability of 
alternative suppliers. 
 
5. Data 
 We tested the implications of the arguments above with data from Compustar, a provider of a 
variety of IT services and computer-related hard- ware. The IT industry involves the storage, transfer, 
and management of information, typically using mainframes, servers, or related devices. IT suppliers, 
such as Compustar, perform a variety of IT projects for their customers that include, but are not limited 
to, designing customized software systems, updating and maintaining existing software or hardware 
systems, and assisting with network design and security. The technological areas included in this 
industry are many and include, but are not limited to, areas such as IBM-compatible mainframes, 
OS/390 programming. Sun systems, databases (e.g., Oracle, Informix), customized software support, and 
development in a variety of languages. 
 Compustar was historically a manufacturer of mainframes and related devices (e.g., storage 
processors) with a strong, technically oriented customer service organization. Compustar entered the 
platform-independent IT services business in the mid-1980s, and by 1997 its IT services division 
accounted for revenues approaching $100 million worldwide. The firm provided services only for their 
proprietary platforms before this time. Compustar’s IT service contracts do not include large IT 
outsourcing deals that involve the supplier operating the buyer’s data center or outsourcing all IT 
functions. 
 Compustar provided us access to all IT service contracts in their corporate contracts library. The 
contracts date back to 1986, when Compustar first began offering IT services, and run through early 
199S. While we had access to all of the contracts, time and resource limitations enabled the coding of 
only 405 contracts in this dataset, corresponding to all contracts between Compustar and a random 
sample of 141 buyer firms. We had to eliminate 11 contracts that did not fit into one of the three 
designated contract types (and two buyers that only used such non-standard contracts), which left an 
analysis of 394 contracts with 139 North American buyers. Detail regarding the type of contracts chosen 
and the number of  
 contracts signed by each buyer at the corporation level and the site level are presented in Table I. As 
shown in the table, 73 corporations (or 18%) and 85 sites (or 22%) have only signed one contract with 
Compustar. Three corporations with more than 10 contracts each signed a total of 74 contracts. The two 
sites with more than 10 contracts signed a total of 33 contracts. 
 Each contract contains a detailed description of the project, the type of service required, and 
the responsibilities of the parties. A typical contract is about five pages long and is designed to 
accomplish a specific task for the buyer. Project duration ranged from one week to a year, and project 
value ranged from approximately a thousand dollars to several hundred thousand dollars. Only three are 
more than $1 million. In addition to reading the contracts, we interviewed several Computer managers 
and other IT personnel to provide supporting data for this analysis. 
 
5.1 Variables 
 The dependent variable is the choice among the three contract types for each project. The 
independent variables include proxies forex ante uncertainty about cost and specification, ability to 
measure quality ex post, and the prior relationship between the firms. 
 We first focused on four variables related to the complexity of the current project and the 
resulting ex ante uncertainties. Our first variable was a binary variable for whether projects involve 
programming. Compustar is relatively new to programming, as it has historically been a hardware 
manufacturer, and thus estimation of programming projects is likely to be less accurate. Our second 
variable was a binary variable indicating whether the project involves working on Compustar-
manufactured hardware. Compustar is easily able to estimate total project cost and more precisely 
specify the final deliverables when the project involves working on hardware that they have 
manufactured. Our third variable was a dummy indicating whether Compustar would be working with 
the buyer's mainframe. Mainframes are particularly difficult to work on if they have not been 
maintained properly or if they have been heavily customized. While Compustar's expertise in working on 
mainframes makes them fully capable of dealing with whatever they find andcompletingtheprojcct.it 
provides only limited help in estimating the cost because of the importance of how the buyer has 
configured and maintained the machine. Our fourth variable captures a situation in which uncertainly 
about expected costs is low. Compustar personnel coded a dummy variable that indicated whether their 
proprietary technology was required to complete the project. Compustar engineers created a list of 
proprietary technologies that were developed internally. Since Compustar developed these 
technologies, they are very familiar with their quality and the costs of using them. Two engineers coded 
the variable based on their expertise and the records in the contract file. 
 Projects for which Compustar cannot easily measure quality ex post create measurement costs. 
The variable we employed captured whether the technology used in the project made it difficult to 
determine the quality of the output generated by the project team. To limit the amount of time 
engineers had to put into the coding effort. Compustar stipulated that the variable be coded as a binary 
variable equal to one if quality was difficult to determine and zero if it was readily apparent. The 
question that determined the value of this variable was whether a brief, inexpensive test or inspection 
could determine the quality of the work done on the project. 
 To make sure that these variables were not subject to the biases of a single individual, two 
engineers coded the same SO contracts (randomly selected) and then compared how they coded the 
variables for the all measures of contracting hazards and capabilities. Three disagreements were found 
for measurement quality and two for programming. After a brief discussion, the engineers clarified the 
discrepancies and felt very comfortable that they were using the same criteria to code the rest of the 
contracts. 
 To capture the influence of the buyer-supplier relationship, we used two alternative concepts 
based on dollars paid by a buyer to Compustar for previous projects. We had valid estimated cost 
information for 305 of the 394 contracts in our sample. When any of the other 89 contracts without 
estimated cost information was a previous project for a buyer, we simply added the mean project value 
of $83,646 to the total cost of previous projects. Our first relationship variable was corporation specific; 
we measured the total dollars (in $ 100,000s) spent by a buyer corporation on previous IT projects with 
Compustar (the entire history of each Compustar-buyer relationship). A second variable was site 
specific: we counted the previous IT project dollars paid to Compustar by each buyer, counting each 
state w here the buyer's firm has locations as a separate “buyer." The largest buyer firm in our sample, 
for example, has locations in eight different states that have purchased IT services from Compustar. A 
partner at a large IT supplier related to us a case in which a senior IT manager with a buyer firm 
expressed substantial surprise when told how many projects the buyer had undertaken with that IT 
supplier. The buyer’s manager had no know ledge of a large majority of projects undertaken by different 
locations of his own firm. Based on this anecdote and empirical work on the flow of information (e.g., 
Adams and Jaffe. 1996). We believe it is very unlikely that sites of the same buyer corporation on 
opposite coasts, for example, are aware of the contracts signed at the other location, making our site-
specific variable the more accurate test of a relationship. Even if executives were aware of contracts in 
different regions with a supplier, it is unclear how large an effect these distantly signed contracts would 
have on the next contract the firm negotiates with that supplier. 
 We included buyer-specific fixed effects in some regressions as a control. However, because a 
large number of observations had to be removed (those where all contracts selected by a buyer were of 
the same type) when using fixed effects, we also used an alternative approach to control for buyer-
specific effects and/or possible path dependence in the relationship. We included a measure for the 
type of contract chosen for prior exchanges between Compustar and the buyer in some regressions. We 
split a simple count of previous contracts into separate variables based on the type of contract chosen 
on those previous projects. Thus we constructed separate variables for the previous projects that are 
fixed-fee, hybrid, and T&M. These variables were constructed both at the corporation-specific level and 
at the site-specific level for each buyer. Finally, to control for changes in Compustar’s use of contracts 
over time, we included a linear time trend variable, setting the year 1986 to zero. 
 Table 2 contains descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables, from which we can 
observe some of the hypothesized relationships in the raw data. For example, programming and 
customer mainframe projects are positively correlated, 0.46 and 0.09, respectively, with the use of the 
low-powered T&M contracts. Projects using Compustar’s hardware and proprietary technology are 
positively correlated with the use of fixed-fee contracts, as predicted. The site-specific “Previous IT 
Dollars” variable is positively correlated with T&M contracts, though less so than the variables capturing 
project attributes.  
 
6. Methods and Results 
 Since there are three types of contracts, we used an ordered probit formulation to examine 
contract selection. The log-likelihood function of the ordered probit for our three ordered alternatives 
can be written as follows: 
 
where ff a binary variable indicating a fixed-fee contract, HY similarly indicates a hybrid contract, and tm 
represents a T&M contract. The threshold values are denoted by T1 and T2; X is the vector of 
independent variables; B1 and B2 are the vectors of slope coefficients to be estimated corresponding to 
the crossing of thresholds t1 and t2, respectively; and F represents the cumulative normal distribution. 
 
  
  The ordered probit, as typically used by other studies of hybrids such as Baneijee and Duflo 
(2000) and Crocker and Reynolds (1993), imposes a constraint on Equation (1) that B1 and B2 are 
identical. The practical implication is that extreme values of independent variables cannot lead to a 
preference for the intermediate form hybrid contracts in our study. The six regressions in Table 3 
impose this constraint. We also explore whether extreme values of some independent variables might 
lead to a preference for the intermediate hybrid contract. To do so we estimated ordered probit 
regressions in which B1 and B2 were allowed to vary. The eight columns of Table 5 present the results of 
four regressions in which all variables were allowed separate coefficients across the two thresholds. 
 Turning now to the results presented in Table 3, the first four columns present regressions using 
all 394 contracts with 139 suppliers, while the last three columns present fixed-effects regressions 
including only contracts with buyers that exhibit “within-relationship” variation of contract type. The 
regression presented in column 5 analyzes 222 contracts with corporation-specific fixed effects for 34 
buyers. Seventy-three buyer corporations had to be excluded because they only had one contract with 
Compustar, and an additional 32 buyer corporations were excluded because all their contracts selected 
were of the same type. The regression presented in column 6 analyzes 206 contracts with site-specific 
fixed effects for 3S buyers. Eighty-five buyer sites had to be excluded because they only had one 
contract with Compustar, and an additional 35 buyer sites were excluded because all their contracts 
selected were of the same type. Fixed- effects versions of the regressions in columns 2 and 4, which 
include the counts of the previous contract types, could not be estimated because the within-buyer 
variations of the previous contract count variables were too highly correlated (consistently more than 
0.8) with each other and with the respective previous dollar variable. 
 Four variables were used to examine the effect of ex ante cost uncertainty and project 
complexity on the choice of contract. As predicted, the use of Compustar’s hardware and proprietary 
technology, indicators of lower ex ante cost uncertainty, increased the probability of observing a fixed-
fee contract. In addition, programming projects and those that involved a customer’s mainframe, 
indicators of higher uncertainty, led to a greater probability of observing a T&M contract. Results for all 
four of these variables supported the prediction that decreases in project complexity and expected 
variance in cost would lead to T&M contracts. Greater difficulty in measuring quality ex post led to a 
greater likelihood of observing a T&M contract. This provides support for the prediction that ex post 
measurement costs lead firms to substitute away from fixed-fee contracts and move toward T&M 
contracts that decrease the incentive to underprovide quality.  
 
 
  
 The results for the five uncertainty and measurement variables are very robust across all six 
regressions in Table 3. From Table 4, we observe that these variables are also economically meaningful. 
The first row of Table 4 presents a hypothetical baseline project (Baseline I) where all the five binary 
variables have a value of zero, while the site-specific relationship in dollars and the time variable are 
held at their means. In other words, if the project does not include programming, does not involve the 
customer’s mainframe or Compustar's hardware or proprietary technology, and quality is not difficult to 
measure, the probability that a fixed-fee contract is used is 0.8, using the coefficients from the third 
column of Table 3. The probability that a hybrid contract will be used is 0.09 and that a T&M contract 
will be used is 0.11. A different project identical in all ways to Baseline I but that involves programming 
will use a fixed-fee contract with a far lower probability of 0.4; the probability that a T&M contract will 
be used greatly increased to 0.45. The remainder of the first six rows of Table 4 can be interpreted 
similarly. The second set of rows in Table 4 presents a different baseline project (Baseline II) where all 
the five binary variables have a value of one, while the site-specific relationship in dollars and the time 
variable are again held at their means. If the project includes programming, a customer’s mainframe, 
Compustar’s hardware and proprietary technology, and quality is difficult to measure, the probability 
that a fixed-fee contract Is used is 0.58. The probability that a hybrid contract will be used is 0.15 and 
that a T&M contract will be used is 0.27. A project identical to Baseline II but that does not involve 
programming will use a fixed-fee contract with a far higher probability of 0.91; the probability that a 
T&M contract will be used greatly decreases to 0.04. 
 The fixed-effects columns of Table 4 also include a “mean” fixed effect evaluated across all 38 
site-specific buyers in that subsample. These last three columns show probabilities based on the 
coefficients found in column 6 of Table 3. The predicted probabilities for the changes in the five binary 
variables are very similar in magnitude to those in the first three columns. Once again, these variables 
representing ex ante uncertainties and ex post difficulties to measure quality are shown to be 
economically meaningful in the choice of contract type. 
 We now turn to the variables measuring the significance of the relationship between Compustar 
and the buyers. The first column of Table 3 presents a model with the total dollar amount of all previous 
projects with a buyer corporation counted together as one variable, regardless of the type of contract or 
the location at which those projects took place. The third column presents results using a similar 
variable aggregated across contract types, but not across a buyer’s locations. Here, each state within 
which a buyer corporation operates was counted as a distinct site-specific buyer. The corporate-level 
previous IT dollars variable in the first column was positive and significant, while the site-specific 
variable was just shy (at P< .1 1) of statistical significance. However, the significance of the corporate-
level variable completely disappears when Compustar’s largest buyer, with 42 contracts, is removed 
from the analysis. The site-specific variable, on the other hand, becomes significant if tills buyer is 
excluded. Further, once buyer-specific fixed effects are included, as shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 
3, we observe that the site-specific relationship variable becomes significant, and the corporation-
specific variable again loses its significance. 
 
  
  
 The second and fourth columns in Table 3 present results that count as separate variables the 
previous contracts of each type, in addition to including the previous IT dollars variable for each buyer 
that is aggregated across all contract types. The variables for previous fixed-fee, previous hybrid, and 
previous T&M contracts in the second column aggregate those counts across all locations of each buyer 
corporation, while those in the fourth column count only those projects that have taken place at a 
specific location. We observe a strong correlation between the type of contract used in past transactions 
and the type of contract used for the current transaction. The previous contract type variables based on 
a specific buyer location, presented in the fourth column, are similar but more highly significant. While 
the coefficients of these variables may show some autoregressive bias and may capture site-specific 
heterogeneity, and thus cannot be directly interpreted, they remain useful control variables to test the 
robustness of the dollar relationship variable. 
 Turning to the bottom half of Table 4, the effect of relationships on contract choice is 
economically significant, but does not have the large effect in altering choice of contract type that the 
uncertainty and quality measurement variables had. Using the full sample of contracts, we observe that 
increasing the previous dollars spent by a site-specific buyer from the minimum ($0) to one standard 
deviation above the mean ($642,000) increases the likelihood that a T&M contract is chosen from 0.09 
to 0.13 (when the binary variables are all set to zero) and from 0.25 to 0.31 (when the binary variables 
are all set to one). However, as shown in the last three columns of the bottom half of Table 4, the subset 
of contracts between Compustar and those buyer sites that had more than one contract (and that did 
not have all contracts of the same type) showed a stronger effect of the previous relationship. 
Increasing the previous dollars spent by a site-specific buyer within this subset from the minimum of 
zero to one standard deviation above the mean increases the likelihood that a T&M contract is chosen 
from 0.04 to 0.17 (when the binary variables are all set to zero) and from 0.13 to 0.36 (when the binary 
variables are all set to one). For this subset, at least, a substantial portion of the “within- buyer" 
variation in choice of contract type is explained by the dollar magnitude of the previous relationship. 
 In Table 5, we relax the restriction that coefficients for each variable have the same coefficient 
across the two thresholds. The coefficients B1 (for the threshold between fixed-fee and hybrid) and B2 
(for the threshold between hybrid and T&M) within the same regression are presented in separate 
columns. If both B1 and B2 are positive, then greater values of the independent variable lead to T&M 
contracts, while negative values of both B1 and B2 lead to fixed-fee contracts. When B1, is positive and B2 
is negative, then greater values of the variable are likely to lead to a higher probability of observing a 
hybrid contract. If B1 is negative and B2 is positive, then the variable leads to either polar contract type 
and away from hybrids. 
 

  For the five binary variables representing uncertainty and difficulty of ex post quality 
measurement, the signs of the coefficients are completely consistent across the two thresholds. In 
addition, both coefficients for each of the first three variables, which measured complexity and 
uncertainty, are statistically significant. This indicates that the variables' effect on the choices between 
fixed-fee and hybrid and between hybrid and T&M contracts are similar. Turning to the bottom half of 
Table 5, contrary to our prediction, we find that hybrid contracts do not serve as a form of insurance for 
new buyers. As with the five variables that examine ex ante uncertainty and ex post measurement costs, 
hybrid contracts are used at intermediate levels of a prior relationship. The results from the previous 
site-specific IT dollars variable indicate that the greater the buyer and supplier's previous experience 
with each other, the more likely they are to utilize lower-powered T&M contracts instead of hybrid 
contracts. 
 While we do not present the results here, we also estimated regressions with each of the two 
largest buyer firms excluded from the analysis in the case for two separate coefficients with each 
variable. The results with respect to corporate-level previous IT dollars completely disappear. The results 
regarding all site-specific variables remain at the levels of significance reported above. Finally, the 
results are also robust to different methods of dealing with missing revenue data, such as giving these 
projects a value of $0 or excluding them from the sample. 
 
7. Discussion 
 Our basic results with regard to the incentive properties of contracts are consistent with 
previous findings in the contracting literature. When projects are complex, costs and final specifications 
of the deliverable are difficult to estimate in advance. In such cases, as measured by projects involving 
programming and customer mainframes and those not involving Compustar's own hardware or 
propriety technology, T&M contracts with low-powered incentives are used more often. A related 
contribution in this dimension is that we confirm, rather than just assume, that hybrid contracts are 
more likely to be used at intermediate levels of ex ante cost uncertainty and ex post quality 
measurement difficulty. 
 We found that when transactions involve a firm's proprietary technology, the firms were more 
likely to select a fixed-fee contract. While this is consistent with the argument that proprietary 
technology reduces uncertainty, it is also interesting because another interpretation of this variable is 
that it captures an instance in which Compustar has private information about the costs of the 
transaction. Using this interpretation, our results are similar to Corts’ (2002) finding that fixed-fee 
contracts between oil and gas exploration companies (the buyers) and contract drillers (the suppliers) 
become more prevalent with increased experience on the part of the drillers. While these findings are 
contrary to the predictions of economic models involving only a single buyer and supplier (e.g., Baron 
and Besanko, 1987), they are more consistent with models in which a buyer can choose among suppliers 
in a competitive bidding situation. McAfee and McMillan (1986) presented theory indicating that, given 
private information of each supplier regarding their technology, the likelihood of choosing higher-
powered (fixed-fee) incentive contracts increases with the number of suppliers bidding for the project. If 
the buyer can select from among many suppliers, they can play suppliers off against one another and 
get them to reveal the quality of the technology. 
 We make two contributions in the area of previous relationships between the supplier and its 
buyers. First, site-specific measures of relationship magnitude (dollars spent on previous projects) push 
the parties toward lower-powered T&M contracts. Corts and Singh (2004) found that the existence of a 
prior relationship between the buyer and the supplier lowers the cost of using both fixed-fee and T&M 
contracts but does more to favor the use of the latter by serving as an alternative way to provide 
incentives to the supplier. As did Corts and Singh, we found that a relationship between the two parties 
does more to overcome the limitations of T&M contracts than fixed-fee contracts. It appears to be the 
case that relationships serve to provide an alternative source of incentives for efficiency, the traditional 
weakness of T&M contracts. The frequent, unanticipated disturbances in the IT industry may make the 
use of fixed-fee contracts problematic. The parties may assume that adjustment will be easy, but then 
find that it is not and turn to the lower-powered incentive properties of the hybrid and T&M contracts. 
 Contrary to our predictions, the hybrid contract does not appear to serve as a form of insurance 
to new' buyers of IT services. Just as for the variables measuring complexity, the hybrid contracts arc 
used at an intermediate stage of a buyer/seller relationship between fixed-fee and T&M contracts. Our 
second contribution relative to relationships and contract choice is the finding that the site-specific 
relationship variables consistently have more explanatory power than those variables measured at the 
corporate level. Consistent with anecdotal evidence and previous empirical work (e.g. Adams and Jaffe, 
1996), our findings are consistent with the notion that the distance between various locations of a buyer 
firm acts as an impediment to communication regarding suppliers and contracts used. 
 A more thorough study of different types of contracts and when they are used would be a 
fruitful topic for future research. One contract used for a short time by Compustar was a percentage of 
savings contract. When a job called for Compustar to supply an activity that was designed to save the 
buyer money (e.g., a software audit), the firm and the buyer occasionally entered into a contract in 
which Compustar's revenue for the project was tied directly to how much money was saved. However, 
this contract broke down because of difficulties in measuring the realized cost savings, so Compustar 
discontinued it (the 11 contracts eliminated from our analysis were of this type). Examining other types 
of contracts and what incentive, risk, and other features they offer to facilitate different exchanges has 
been the focus of practitioner-oriented research, but this approach also holds promise for more rigorous 
empirical evaluation. 
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